In the present chapter we introduce several generalizations to the formulation and solution of the bargaining problem. Until the early 1960s, the study of social power (including political power) had been carried out exclusively by social scholars. That changed in 1962, when Harsanyi managed to introduce the rigor of mathematical reasoning into the theory of social power. He achieved this by applying the analytical tools and models of game theory. In addition to certain significant contributions, Harsanyi provided a clear interpretation which eliminated much of the ambiguity that had plagued the theory of social power prior to the publication of Harsanyi's works on the subject (Harsanyi 1962a(Harsanyi , 1962b.
parties exceeds two. This is particularly true of policy negotiation settings. When there are more than two parties involved in the bargaining, coalition forming is always possible.
Many political economic models take the coalitions as given. In his seminal 1983 paper, Gary Becker took this approach but noted that "an explicit modeling of coalition formation would surely add to the power of the approach" (Becker, 1983) . This explicit modeling is exactly what Harsanyi did in his 1963 formulation and proposed solution of the generalized n-person bargaining problem. Of necessity the bargaining problem is far more complicated in the n-party case. Furthermore, both the formulation and the solution concept of the n-person bargaining problem reflect both strategic and cooperative conceptualization. Section 3.3 is devoted to describing and explaining the Harsanyi model. Finally, our political-power theoretic approach adopted in later chapters relies heavily on the model of political power proposed in Harsanyi (1962a Harsanyi ( , 1962b . To lay the groundwork, we present Harsanyi's model of the social power relationship in Section 3.4. The presentation is rather brief and concise, but it is sufficiently comprehensive to be self-contained.
Endogenous Disagreement Payoffs
In the bargaining game discussed in Chapter 2 it was assumed that the disagreement (conflict) payoffs, t = (t 1 , t 2 ), were predetermined by the rules of the game as given fixed values.
Such a relationship is not unheard of in real-world bargaining situations. Nevertheless, quite often the bargaining parties are capable of influencing the disagreement payoffs, thus affecting the solutions payoffs of the corresponding bargaining game. This suggests extending the "simple" bargaining game by turning it into a stage of a more complex game. It is assumed that in the first stage of this game each player announces the conflict strategies that will be employed by him should the players fail to agree in the second stage. It is also assumed that the announced strategies are binding and will be carried out by both players.
Let Σ i be the sets of conflict strategies available to player i. Similarly, let θ i be player i's disagreement strategy choice. That is, θ i ∈ Σ i . We begin by considering a two person game where i ∈ {1, 2}. In this setting, we let U i (θ i , θ j ) denote player i's payoff as a function of player i's and player j's conflict strategies. This means that player i's disagreement payoff can be written t i = U i (θ i , θ j ).
In Chapter 2, we defined H as the set of payoff vectors in the payoff space, P , not dominated, even weakly, by any other payoff vector in P . We also defined
the set of payoff vectors in P that leave both parties at least as well off as in the conflict outcome. We denoted the upper-right boundary of P * by H * ⊆ H. The bargaining problem in Chapter 2 was then: Given P * and (i = 1, 2), what solution will the bargaining parties eventually reach? In this chapter, t is made endogenous and the bargaining problem becomes:
Given P and a set of possible conflict strategies Σ i (i = 1, 2), what will be the solutionū? To reach the solution, it is assumed that once the disagreement payoffs have been determined in the first, noncooperative stage of the bargaining game, the solution to the second stage is the plain Nash bargaining solution, i.e. the pointū = (ū 1 ,ū 2 ) ∈ H * satisfying (3.1a)
Formally, let H (u 1 , u 2 ) = 0 be the equation of H * and assume that the partial derivatives, H 1 (ū 1 ,ū 2 ) = a 1 and H 2 (ū 1 ,ū 2 ) = a 2 , are nonzero. We know that along the upper-right boundary of the (convex) payoff set P , an increase in player i's payoff must decrease player j's payoff or that Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximizing (u 1 − t 1 ) (u 2 − t 2 ) with respect to u 1 and u 2 subject to H (u 1 , u 2 ) = 0 are
These conditions imply that for a given payoff space P * , any pair of disagreement payoffs (t 1 , t 2 ) that satisfy (3.2a) yield the solutionū. This situation is demonstrated in Figure 3 .1 where both t and t satisfy (3.2a) and both yield the solutionū.
Let C (ū) denote the line in P whose equation is a 1 t 1 − a 2 t 2 = a 1ū1 − a 2ū2 . Note that C (ū) is then the set of disagreement payoffs that satisfy (3.2a) and thus yield the solution u. As we move up and to the left along H * , the outcome becomes more favorable for player 2. This movement increases the point at which C (ū) hits the u 2 axis and simultaneously decreases the slope of the line C (ū). Because a given point (t 1 , t 2 ) has a unique solution, no two lines C (ū) and C (ū * ) can intersect. As a result, if C (ū * ) lies above and to the left of C (ū),ū * is more favorable to player 2 thanū. It can also be shown that ifū is more favorable to player 1 thanū Similarly, ifū * is more favorable to player 2 thanū (i.e.ū * 2 >ū 2 ), then
Accordingly, it is in the interest of player 1 to maximize a 1 t 1 − a 2 t 2 , while player 2's interest is to minimize the same expression. Consequently, the chosen conflict strategies are given by We can therefore characterize the solution to the full two-person bargaining model by the set of necessary and sufficient conditions given by
The n-Person Bargaining Game
In contrast to the two-person bargaining game with endogenous disagreement payoffs, it is natural to assume that in the n-person case (n > 2) parties will be able to form coalitions.
We focus here on Harsanyi's solution to the resulting n-person cooperative bargaining game (Harsanyi 1963) . In formulating the relevant model, Harsanyi stated:
"the final payoffs of the game are determined by a whole network of various agreements among the players and we shall try to define the equilibrium conditions of mutual consistency and interdependence that these various agreements have to satisfy. That is, we shall assume that each such agreement between players will represent a bargaining equilibrium situation between the participants if all other agreements between the players are regarded as given." (Harsanyi, 1963: 205) Essentially, Harsanyi's solution results from considering the entire bargaining game to be a complex nest of two-party bargaining games between players and coalitions where the solution to any given bargaining is the solution to the two-party game resulting from taking all other payoffs as given.
To discuss Harsanyi's solution, we must first define his notation. Let N represent the set of all n players involved in the bargaining game. Each player i ∈ N can belong to many coalitions S ⊂ N . From each of these, he receives a secure payoff w It is, of course, required that the final solution be on the upper-right boundary of the payoff space, that is
As noted in Chapter 2, this is equivalent to requiring that the final solution be Pareto optimal.
Each coalition S guarantees its members' payoffs by announcing a conflict strategy θ S .
The conflict strategies determine the conflict payoffs, u S i and uS j , that the members of S and S receive. Thus we can write
The set S may contain several subsets R that also contain i. It is logical to conclude that
This condition simply implies that the subsets of S cannot guarantee its members more in the aggregate than the coalition S could secure by bargaining withS and that all payoffs secured by the coalition S will be distributed by its member coalitions. The payoff from the entire game is given by
Now, suppose we assume that no payoffs are negative. 1 The distribution between players i and j of payoffs from a coalition S they both belong to is determined in a bargaining game between i and j where the following payments are taken as given: (1) the payoffs to other players (u S k for all k ∈ S where k = i, j), (2) player i's payoffs from all coalitions j is not a member of (u S i for all S ⊂ N where j / ∈ S), and (3) player j's payoffs from all coalitions that i is not a member of (u S j for all S ⊂ N where i / ∈ S). Denote this bargaining game G S ij .
If players i and j fail to agree on payoffs, the coalition S will be unable to operate since it requires unanimous agreement from its members. Therefore, the disagreement payoffs are given by what players i and j can secure from other coalitions, i.e. This relationship implies that
In similar fashion, we can express the disagreement payoffs for the entire game as Harsanyi then expresses the disagreement payoffs in alternative form, which will be useful later. Note that the inverse of the relationship given in (3.10) and (3.11) is (3.15) w
where s = |S| and r = |R| denote the number of players in coalitions S and R, respectively. Since this relationship is not immediately obvious, we present a simple example to demonstrate. Consider a game where N = S = {1, 2, 3}. There are three subsets of S which contain player 1: R 1 = {1}, R 2 = {1, 2}, and R 3 = {1, 3}. By (3.10)
Finally, since there are no subsets of R 1 , we have
Combining (3.16), (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19) and solving for w
The sign pattern here is consistent with (3.15) since the coalitions with two members (s−r = 1) have negative signs, the entire group has a positive sign (s − r = 0), and the individual member has a positive sign (s − r = 2).
Substituting (3.15) in (3.13) gives us
which is the form used by Harsanyi's in defining the solution to the problem.
The entire game can be thought of as a series of two-party bargaining games. Hence, the final payoffs,ū = (ū 1 , ...,ū n ), must satisfy
While they may appear complicated due to the notation, these conditions follow quite naturally from the previous discussion. (3.22a) requires that the solution be on the efficiency frontier and (3.22b) is the familiar first order condition derived by Nash. (3.22c) through (3.22e) formally define the quantities a m , u S i , and t S i as we have defined them in the preceding text. Finally, conditions (3.22f) and (3.22g) require that the solution payoffs for the bargaining within coalitions also satisfy the Nash first order conditions.
As written, these conditions in (3.22a) through (3.22g) require the existence of the partial derivative of H at the solution valueū. However, we can replace (3.22a) and (3.22c) with
and i∈N a iūi = max u∈P i∈N a i u i to attain the general conditions. The last two conditions imply that, given constants a 1 , ..., a n (a i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N ), the bargaining solution,ū, is the payoff vector maximizing the weighted sum a i U i over the payoff space, P . Since P is compact and convex,ū exists and is a unique element of H, or H (ū) = 0.
Harsanyi (1963) also demonstrated that the solution payoff is given by what he calls a "generalized Shapley value." To do so, he defined the quantity Z S = i∈S a i u S i , which is a weighted sum of the utility gained by the individual members of S. If, as before, s = |S| is the number of members in coalition S and r is the number of players in coalition R, Harsanyi proved that
This alternative method for specifying the solution plays an important role in the measurement of power described in Section 3.4.
Reciprocal Power Relations
In his analyses, Harsanyi distinguished two principal modes of social influence broadly con- 
Reciprocal Power in Two-Party Games
As we did with the bargaining model, we begin by considering the measurement of power in games involving only two parties. Our treatment adopts the scenario offered in Harsanyi (1962a). Suppose A wants B to perform X with probability p 2 when, in the absence of A's intervention, B would perform X with probability p 1 only (p 1 < p 2 ). If B completely refused to do X he would obtain a utility of u 0 and A would obtain a utility of u * 0 . A offers B a reward of R if B complies with A's demand and threatens B with a penalty of T if B elects to perform X with only probability p 1 . Suppose the value of the reward R to B is r utility units and the cost of R to A is r * utility units. Similarly, the sanction T entails a loss of t units to B and a cost of t * units to A. If B performs X he loses x utility units while A enjoys a gain of x * units. Then, if B complies with A's demand and performs X with probability p 2 , the parties' expected utilities are
If B does not comply with A's demand and a conflict situation arises, then the parties' expected utilities are
In this context, a bargaining problem emerges where the parties bargain over how much influence A can exert on B (i.e. on the value of p 2 ). The agreement payoffs are given by u A and u B while the disagreement payoffs are given byũ A andũ B . From Section 3.2, we know that taking T and R as given, the Nash solution solves (3.26) max
The solution is
The theory of optimal threat strategies presented in Section 3.2 tells us that A's optimal strategy is to select the value of T that maximizes [(t/x) − (t * /x * )] and a value of R that 
According to Harsanyi, r + t is the cost to B of being in conflict with A instead of cooperating and thus "measures the (gross) absolute strength of A's power over B." The quantity (r + t) /x can then be thought of as "the gross relative strength of A's power over B with respect to action X" (Harsanyi, 1962a, 77) . The complementary action X * denotes
A tolerating B's noncompliance, which can be thought of as B inducing A to take an action he/she would not otherwise take. Therefore, t * − r * is the absolute strength of B's power over A while (t * − r * ) /x * is the relative strength of that power. The difference between the gross relative strengths, r+t x − t * −r * x * , measures "the net strength of A's power over B with respect to action X" (Harsanyi 1962a: 78) . Therefore, Dahl's quantity-of-power measure in a reciprocal bilateral power relationship is equal to one half of the net strength of A's power over B with respect to the action X. The foregoing definitions and derivations reflect the reciprocal power relationship inherent in the bargaining model of social power.
Reciprocal Power in n-Party Games
Just as the bargaining model becomes considerably more complex with more than two parties, measuring power in n-party games is more difficult. Harsanyi's method for measuring this power draws heavily on the bargaining framework we reviewed in Section 3.3. We present here some of the highlights of Harsanyi's formulation.
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Harsanyi defines several types of power that exist when a group of individuals has to choose among several alternative policies. The first is called specific power and is the probability that an individual's most-preferred policy is adopted. If players have preferences between other policies, however, this is not an adequate measure of an individual's power.
Instead, Harsanyi defines generic power as the sum of the utility the individual gains from each alternative, weighted by the probability of that policy being adopted by the group. It is thus a measure of "i's power to get the group to adopt some policy reasonably satisfactory to him." He then decomposes an individual's generic power into two components. Independent power measures the ability of individuals to secure good outcomes without cooperation from other parties and incentive power measures their ability to use rewards and penalties to convince other groups to accept outcomes the individuals prefer.
Suppose there are N players considering M alternative policies, one of which will be adopted. Let x ij represent the utility player i gains from alternative j, and let p j denote the probability that alternative j is chosen. The probability p i measures individual i's specific power and the quantity
measures individual i's generic power. Using his bargaining framework, Harsanyi is able to predict the value ofp i for any given game. In particular, it can be derived using the generalized Shapley values discussed at the end of Section 3.3. In the case of conflict between coalitions S andS, let the quantities P S and PS represent the weighted total utility gained by members of coalitions. Similarly, the quantities T S and TS represent the weighted total utility losses caused by the punishment strategies pursued by these coalitions. The quantity expression represent the decomposition of this power into its two components. The quantity P S − PS represents the ability of coalition S to get its agenda adopted without the cooperation of the rest of the group. Hence, the first term measures the independent power of i (and his potential allies). In contrast, the second term measures difference between the rewards gained by the group, R − a i r i , if they cooperate with individual i and the penalties they face, T S − TS, if they fail to reach agreement with i (and his potential allies).
Harsanyi also emphasized that this power measure incorporates "the effects of alliances and party alignments among participants." These impacts are reflected by the summation over all potential coalitions S. Furthermore, the approach reflects the "improvements in all participants' power positions when suitable compromise policies are discovered."
Conclusion
In Chapters 2 and 3, we have described the Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi bargaining theory. Essentially, Harsanyi's imaginative model of social power as a bargaining relation provides the basic conceptual formulation. In later chapters we will use this as the foundation for our political power theory of endogenous policy formation. Chapter 4 will be dedicated to the detailed description and formulation of the political process in terms of Harsanyi's underlying framework. In the rest of this book we shall outline the many ramifications of the basic idea, thus providing a rather broad view of the impressive tree that grew out of the seed planted by Harsanyi in the early 1960s.
